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adequate gauge for impairment. 
Among patients whose sleep needs 
are satisfied with the use of the 
lower doses, unnecessary risk can 
be avoided, and as the labels 
point out, patients whose symp-
toms do not respond to the lower 
doses can be given the higher 
doses. The sex-specific labeling 
revisions reflect an evidence-based 
approach to risk management 
and dose individualization.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors 
are available with the full text of this article 
at NEJM.org.
From the Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research, Food and Drug Administration, 
Silver Spring, MD.
This article was published on August 7, 
2013, at NEJM.org.
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(http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/
ucm334033.htm).
3. FDA drug safety communication: FDA 
approves new label changes and dosing for 
zolpidem products and a recommendation 
to avoid driving the day after using Ambien 
CR (http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/
ucm352085.htm).
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Zolpidem and Driving Impairment
The Unanticipated Consequences of Postponing  
the Employer Mandate
Mark V. Pauly, Ph.D., and Adam A. Leive, M.Sc.
The Obama administration’s decision to postpone imple-
mentation of the employer man-
date is the latest in a series of 
delays and alterations of the Af-
fordable Care Act (ACA). But post-
poning the mandate — which 
requires larger employers to of-
fer lower-income workers health 
insurance coverage similar to 
that available in the new insur-
ance exchanges, on equal and 
affordable financial terms — 
may create large ripple effects. 
The good news is that as com-
pared with instituting the man-
date as planned, postponing it 
should barely increase the num-
ber of uninsured Americans after 
ACA implementation. But it af-
fects other provisions, particu-
larly the individual subsidies for 
purchasing insurance, and cre-
ates distorted incentives that may 
leave the government paying sig-
nificantly more than planned.
More than 90% of Americans 
who obtain private health insur-
ance today receive it through em-
ployers, but the centerpiece of the 
ACA’s effort to make coverage 
more attractive to the uninsured 
focuses on insurance exchanges 
for individuals purchasing cover-
age directly. However, because 
both consumers and employers 
can in principle finance or obtain 
private health insurance in either 
setting, ACA provisions had to be 
compatible with both coverage 
channels. Moreover, the legisla-
tion created tax-financed subsi-
dies for buying insurance only 
through the exchanges while rely-
ing largely on regulations and 
mandates to deal with employ-
ment-based coverage. Inevitably, 
this grafting of a new institu-
tional and subsidy structure onto 
an already-complex system raises 
problems of potentially incompat-
ible and inequitable incentives.
Fortunately, postponing the 
mandate will probably not vastly 
increase the number of people 
who remain uninsured, because 
most large employers already pro-
vide health benefits. Most would 
therefore face little burden in com-
plying, even though the proximate 
cause of postponement is appar-
ently the challenge of drafting re-
porting requirements. The 95% 
of firms that offer coverage, 
however, don’t offer it to every 
worker at low explicit premiums, 
often excluding part-time, new, 
temporary, and low-wage workers. 
About 10% of uninsured Ameri-
cans (5.5 million people) live in 
households with a worker affect-
ed by the large-employer mandate 
(see table). The $10 billion in rev-
enues expected from the man-
date’s penalty (5 million uninsured 
workers × $2,000) is a small frac-
tion of the eventual cost of the 
exchange subsidies. (The Congres-
sional Budget Office estimates 
that in 2023, with full implemen-
tation, the annual subsidy cost will 
be $153 billion.1) So although the 
mandate would have reduced the 
coverage gap and raised some 
revenue, the effects of delaying 
it will be modest.
Meanwhile, the ACA’s individ-
ual mandate remains in place. To 
the extent that this mandate 
causes people to seek or retain 
coverage, workers may still pre-
fer their qualified coverage to be 
furnished through work rather 
than exchanges — especially if 
they are uninsured or incom-
pletely insured but have income 
high enough that the tax exemp-
tion for employment-based cover-
age is worth more than their ex-
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org at UNIV OF PENN LIBRARY on June 1, 2016. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 2013 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 
PERSPECTIVE
n engl j med 369;8 nejm.org august 22, 2013692
change subsidy. The stimulus for 
this middle-class minority to ob-
tain employer-sponsored insur-
ance will be effective only if the 
individual mandate is aggressive-
ly enforced — and it’s difficult to 
tax workers who owe little in-
come tax and see coverage as un-
affordable.
But the demise of the em-
ployer mandate has a potentially 
more important side effect: it re-
moves incentives for employers 
to offer coverage to lower-income 
workers at low enough explicit 
premiums that they would choose 
job-based coverage over exchange 
coverage. The ACA sought high 
“target efficiency” — aiming 
subsidies only at lower-income 
uninsured people without a large-
group insurance option and 
avoiding having subsidies claimed 
by people at the same income 
level who already have large-
group insurance. This goal was 
buttressed politically by the view 
that employers should pay their 
“fair share” of the cost of cover-
age out of their profits (despite 
strong economic arguments that 
workers ultimately pay for man-
dated benefits through lower 
wages or job loss2,3). To restrain 
lower-income workers from swap-
ping employer insurance for ex-
change insurance, the regulations 
required employers with at least 
50 employees to offer coverage 
with low enough explicit premi-
ums to keep the group alterna-
tive more attractive.
With that threat gone, it may 
make sense for employers and 
lower-wage workers to implicitly 
agree to a deal whereby such 
workers buy insurance through 
exchanges using government- 
financed subsidies and are “made 
whole” through higher wages. 
Higher-income workers could still 
choose group insurance, taking 
advantage of their larger tax break. 
The graph illustrates the value 
of the exchange subsidy relative 
to the tax exemption for employer-
sponsored coverage according to 
income. Of course, separating em-
ployees in this way is complex, 
but many firms already provide 
different benefits to different 
classes of workers, who often 
have different wage levels; for 
example, some restaurants offer 
low-premium coverage to man-
agement and key workers but not 
to waitstaff. Paradoxically, the 
postponement does not reduce a 
“burden” on employers as much 
as it creates an opportunity for 
them to work with their employ-
ees to take maximum advantage 
of exchange subsidies.
Crowding out of fully paid pri-
vate insurance by more generously 
subsidized coverage has previously 
been documented with Medicaid,4 
but the threat it poses to the gov-
ernment budget for financing the 
ACA is much more substantial. 
Under the old rules, enrollment 
among people with incomes be-
low 400% of the federal poverty 
level (the cutoff for subsidies) was 
projected to total 19 million by 
2016, with modest growth there-
after.1 But, as the table shows, 
more than 100 million Americans 
live in households with a worker 
whose income falls between 
the Medicaid threshold and the 
exchange-subsidy cutoff. Thus, 
penalty-free crowd-out runs the 
risk of dramatically boosting fed-
eral outlays for subsidies. Accord-
ing to our analysis of the Current 
Population Survey, an estimated 
53 million Americans who are ei-
ther employed by firms with more 
than 50 employees or are such 
workers’ dependents would be eli-
Postponing the Employer Mandate
Estimated Numbers of Americans Younger Than 65 Years of Age,  
According to Insurance Status, Income, and Employer Size, 2011.*
Insurance Status
Income 138–400% 
of the Federal 
Poverty Level
Income 138–350% 
of the Federal 
Poverty Level
no. in millions
Any 100.4 86.3
Public insurance only 9.8 9.2
In firms with ≥50 employees 1.6 1.4
Private insurance only 68.4 56.7
Employer-sponsored insurance 62.3 51.4
In firms with ≥50 employees 49.1 40.1
Individual market 6.0 5.3
In firms with ≥50 employees 2.0 1.8
Private and public insurance 5.7 5.0
Employer-sponsored insurance 4.8 4.2
In firms with ≥50 employees 3.6 3.1
Individual market 0.9 0.8
In firms with ≥50 employees 0.3 0.2
Uninsured 16.5 15.3
In firms with ≥50 employees 5.5 5.1
* Persons with incomes of 138 to 400% of the federal poverty level are eligible for 
subsidies to purchase insurance through the exchanges; for persons with incomes 
of 138 to 350% of the federal poverty level, the value of the exchange subsidy 
roughly equals the value of the tax exemption for employer-sponsored insurance. 
Data are from an analysis of the Current Population Survey, 2012 Annual Social 
and Economic Supplement.
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gible for subsidized exchange 
coverage. If they moved to ex-
changes, the annual subsidy bill 
could nearly triple.
Of course, paying a much 
larger subsidy to lower-income 
households without employer-
sponsored insurance than to 
those with it was always going 
to cause instability. For example, 
employers already threatened to 
cut low-wage workers’ hours be-
low the law’s 30-hour-per-week 
cutoff to avoid paying for their 
insurance. But potential (and now 
legal) employer responses to 
those nonneutral payments will 
exacerbate the instability. Drop-
ping the employer mandate may 
boost enrollment in the exchang-
es, leading to such high expendi-
tures on subsidies that taxpayer 
and political support for the ACA 
is weakened. Even unions have 
now reversed their earlier support 
for the legislation by demanding 
that their members who are cov-
ered by multiemployer plans (“Taft-
Hartley plans”) receive exchange 
subsidies, too.
Such changes may have other 
implications. Current employer-
paid coverage is most generous in 
terms of physician and hospital 
reimbursement. Considerable evi-
dence suggests that plans must be 
frugal in their provider payments 
to qualify for many states’ ex-
changes and to constitute eco-
nomical options for consumers. 
Both lower reimbursement rates 
and stricter managed-care rules 
may limit treatment of patients 
who formerly had more permis-
sive insurance.
Our large, employment-based 
insurance system has historically 
been propped up by tax subsidies 
that make it cheaper than direct-
ly purchasing individual insurance. 
For the lower-middle-income pop-
ulation, the ACA reverses this 
distortion, potentially shifting 
the inequity in the opposite direc-
tion. Group coverage has some 
merits: when managed by a well-
run, attentive benefits department, 
it can be less administratively 
costly than individual insurance, 
better tailored to workers’ 
needs, and less prone to adverse 
selection. Economically, it would 
be ideal to offer equal subsidies 
regardless of how a person ob-
tains qualified coverage, creat-
ing efficient choices between 
individual and group coverage. 
Perhaps the current threat to the 
employer mandate and target ef-
ficiency will induce us to con-
front the full fiscal cost of fair 
subsidies. Making subsidies 
available on a uniform basis at 
each income level would ideally 
lead to better choices of insur-
ance products, less heated polit-
ical rhetoric, and an opportunity 
to focus on other pressing prob-
lems in our health care system.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors 
are available with the full text of this article 
at NEJM.org.
From the Department of Health Care Man-
agement, Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
This article was published on July 31, 2013, 
at NEJM.org.
1. Effects on health insurance and the fed-
eral budget for the insurance coverage provi-
sions in the Affordable Care Act — May 2013 
baseline. Washington, DC: Congressional 
Budget Office, 2013 (http://www.cbo.gov/
publication/44190).
2. Summers L. Some simple economics of 
mandated benefits. Am Econ Rev 1989;79: 
177-83.
3. Pauly M. Health benefits at work: an eco-
nomic and political analysis of employment-
based health insurance. Ann Arbor: Univer-
sity of Michigan Press, 1999.
4. Gruber J, Simon K. Crowd-out 10 years 
later: have recent public insurance expan-
sions crowded out private health insurance? 
J Health Econ 2008;27:201-17.
DOI: 10.1056/NEJMp1308934
Copyright © 2013 Massachusetts Medical Society.
Su
bs
id
y 
as
 P
er
ce
nt
 o
f P
re
m
iu
m
 fo
r 
Si
lv
er
 P
la
n
100
40
50
10
60
20
30
0
70
80
90
2 Adults
1 Adult
Income as Percent of Federal Poverty Level
140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 340 360 380 400
Marginal tax rate for 1 adult
Marginal tax rate for 2 adults
Size of Exchange Subsidies for Families with One Adult and Families with Two Adults, 
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Both single adults and married adults filing taxes jointly have positive taxable income, 
in the 10% income tax bracket, at 138% of the federal poverty level when taking the 
standard deduction and exemptions. If they must pay full taxes for Social Security 
(12.4%) and Medicare (2.9%), their marginal tax rate is 25.3% until their income is 
high enough to put them into the next income tax bracket. In 2013, single adults 
reach the 15% marginal income tax bracket at $8,925 in taxable income, which corre-
sponds to about 165% of the federal poverty level for total household income, and 
married adults filing jointly reach it at $17,850 in taxable income, or about 243% of 
the federal poverty level for total household income. A silver plan is an insurance pol-
icy that covers 70% of insurable spending, on average, for an average person buying 
private insurance. Data are from the Kaiser Family Foundation Subsidy Calculator.
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